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Maritime Products Liability
By D. THo AS McCuNE*
Introduction
SPECTACULAR growth, abandonment of long-established precepts,
constant critical attention from legal scholars and practitioners-all
mark the field of products liability as a place where the action is. The
development of shoreside products liability has been extensively doc-
umented,' analyzed,2 digested,3 praised4 and lamented.5 Its maritime
counterpart has received but scant attention.6 Some may be sur-
prised to learn that a field of maritime products liability exists, while
others may question whether it possesses features suffcienfly distinc-
tive from its terrene companion to warrant separate attention. This
article will demonstrate that such a field does indeed exist and that
the problems present therein are often of a substantially different
nature than those winch arise in the nonmaritime products liability
context.
At the outset we need to know what is meant by "products lia-
bility" "The phrase originated in the insurance offices, where it was
considered useful to characterize the type of hazard against winch
manufacturers and distributors of commercial products were demand-
ing liability insurance policies."r Whatever may be the origins of the
phrase it is clear that more fact situations now are comprehended by
the term than simply those associated with products as that word is
understood in its ordinary sense." On the other hand, since "virtually
* Member, San Francisco Bar and Maritime Law Association of the United States.
'E.g., PNossmi, ToRTs §§ 96-99 (3d ed. 1964); Gillam, Products Liability in a Nut-
shell, 37 OnE. L. REv. 119 (1958). Professor Glam cites over one hundred books, ar-
tides and case notes dealing with products liability. Id. at 128-30. The Index to Legal
Perzodicals, 1961-1966, lists more than 250 publications on the subject.
2 E.g., Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 ST .L. REv. 1077
(1965).
3 E.g., F taum & FRmDmA, PnoDucrs Lkmr (1966) (3 vols.).
4 E.g., Ashe, So You're Going to Try a Products Liability Case, 13 HAST. L.J. 66
(1961).
5 E.g., Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in
Products-An Opposing View, 24 TEN. L. BRv. 938 (1957).
0 See Note, 66 Corxm. L. Rnv. 1190 (1966); Note, 54 GEo. L.J. 1439 (1966);
Note, 37 TuL. L. REv. 141 (1962); Note, 48 VA. L. Rnv. 1467 (1962).
7 Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CA.F. L. Rnv. 614 (1955).
8 See Paossmi, ToaTs §§ 98-99 (3d ed. 1964).
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all of the activities of mankind involve the use of some product ,
nearly all losses in the nature of physical damage to persons or things,
and a great deal of the economic losses . , are factually caused by
characteristics or conditions of products, or at least occur during the
use of products." 9 While a definition limited to products alone is too
narrow, one causally oriented so as to include "nearly all losses in the
nature of physical damage to persons or things" is clearly too broad.
A middle course is thus indicated. As used here the phrase means the
legal liability in damages of those who deal in products or services
which when defectively made or rendered cause injury to the person
or property of those who use or are otherwise affected by them.0
There is no consensus concerning the proper conceptual basis for
the imposition of such liability ii On the contrary, there is a great
deal of academic and judicial ferment about the matter. 2 Generally,
however, tort concepts of negligence, fraud and deceit, and strict
liability are employed, together with contract theories of breach of
express or inplied warranties.' 3 Profound problems involved m the
application of these different theories to particular factual settings
are sometimes overlooked or more often are camouflaged by deft
strokes of the judicial pen, and the lawyer's gobbledegook may be-
come the judge's jabberwock. 4 These problems are compounded
when tort and contract concepts. are mixed and hybrid theories
result. 5 The field of maritime products liability has not escaped such
difficulties. Additionally, it is also subject to certain unique problems.
We shall begin our survey with them.
The Meaning of "Maritime"
Jurisdictional Aspects
Earlier the phrase "products liability" was defined broadly enough
to encompass a wide range of business enterprise activity Exami-
9
lKeeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64
MIcH. L. 1Ev. 1329, 1330 (1966). See generally EHmnEzwc, NEcLcEN CE WrrHonT
FAULT (1951), reprinted in 54 CALF. L. 1Ev. 1422 (1966).
10 See Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CALn'. L. 1Ev. 614 (1955).
11 See Percy, Products Liability-Tort or Contract or What?, 40 TuL. L. REv. 715
(1966).
12 Ibid.
13 See Metzger, Automobiles and Heavy Equipment, 1964 U. ILL. L.F 725.
14 "Very few writers and even fewer courts have been able to identify with any
clarity the distinctions between warranty and negligence, contract and tort, and strict
liability or fault as the basis of liability." Id. at 727.
15 In McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577, 1966 A.M.C. 344 (7th Cir. 1965),
the retailer of a pleasure yacht was held to have breached an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose by nonnegligently selling a boat m an "imminently and in-
herently dangerous" condition. Id. at 579, 1966 A.M.C. at 346.
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nation of maritime products liability requires at the outset a brief
explanation of the criteria employed in, and the significance of, de-
signating a particular cause of action "maritime."
The Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States
"to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction "16 Con-
gressional implementation of the constitutional grant began with the
Judiciary Act of 1789. In the present statutory formulation the
United States district courts "have original jurisdiction, exclusive of
the courts of the States, of any civil case of admiralty or maritnne
jurisdiction "J' When a cause of action is brought m admiralty,
the court must make special inquiry into the nature of the action and
determine affirmatively that it is maritime.19 If it is not, no jurisdic-
tion exists.20
"Two grand divisions have been made in the ]urisprudence by
which the connotations of the words 'admiralty and 'maritime' have
been established. They are 'tort' jurisdiction and 'contract' jurisdic-
tion." 1 Generally, a tort is maritime when it occurs in any body of
water navigable in interstate or foreign commerce, 2 and a contract is
maritime when it relates "to the navigation, business or commerce of
the sea," regardless of where it was made or executed.23 Characteriza-
tion of a cause of action as maritime means that a federal forum is
16 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Little is known about the origin of this clause. See
Putnam, How the Federal Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CoRNELL L.Q.
460 (1925).
171 Stat. 76-77 (1854).
1828 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964). The balance of the statute reads: "saving to suitors in
all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." Ibid. Basically, the
saving clause means that a suitor who holds an m personam claim, which might be en-
forced by an action in personain in admiralty, may also bring, at his election, an ordinary
civil action in a state court or in federal court on the civil side, given diversity of citizen-
ship and the requisite ]unsdictional amount. See GiLMORE & BLAck, THE LAW OF AD-
mla'Y 33-36 (1957) [hereinafter cited as GnaIoim & BrAcE]. Section 1331 grants
jurisdiction to the federal district courts "of civil actions wherein the matter in con-
troversy exceeds $10,000 , and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964). In Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 1959 A.M.C. 832 (1959), the Supreme Court held (5-4)
that a cause of action based on the general maritime law does not arise, in the jurisdic-
tional sense, under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
39 The maritime designation also has significance for an ordinary civil court (state
or federal) because the law to be applied may turn on whether or not the action is
maritime. See discussion under "Choice of Law Aspects," infra p. 839.
11 2028 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
2 l obinson, "Contract" Jurisdiction in Admiralty, 10 TuL. L. REv. 359, 360 (1936).
22 The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). See
GmmoRE & BLAcK 20-22, 29. But see, Drumgold v. Splosna Plovba, 260 F Supp. 983
(E.D. Va. 1966).
23 De Lovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, 444 (No. 3776) (C.C. Mass. 1815). See
GmonE & BrAcE 20-21.
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available to the plaintiff24 without regard to the citizenship of the
parties or the amount m controversy 25 and may also mean that rules
of substantive law are applicable which are different from those which
would apply if his action were nonmaritime.
The use of spatial and conceptual criteria as a means for deter-
mining the maritime quality of, respectively, tort and contract actions
has resulted m some anomalous maritime or nonmaritime designa-
tions. For example, despite an early Supreme Court dictum that "every
species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or
not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cog-
mzance," 6 there remained some thought that a maritime nexus other
than the mere occurrence of an injury on a jurisdictionally appropriate
body of water was required for a tort action to be justiciable in ad-
miralty 27 Doubts to the contrary notwithstanding, the quoted dictum
has been taken quite literally by the lower federal courts as reflected
by the holdings in the recent series of admiralty cases involving air-
craft.28 Weinstein v. Eastern Atrlines29 is representative. There recov-
ery was sought m admiralty for deaths occurring when an airliner
crashed into the navigable waters of Boston Harbor shortly after take-
off on a scheduled flight to Philadelphia. Named as defendants were
the airline, the builder of the plane and the manufacturer of its en-
gines. The actions were challenged by the defendants on the ground
that admiralty jurisdiction was dependent not only upon the locus of
the tort, but upon a finding of some other maritime connection with
24 Until recently the plaintiff in an admiralty action was called the 'libelant," the
defendant was the "respondent" and the complaint was called the "libel." See Surk. CT.
Ara. R. 22. On July 1, 1966, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became applicable
to "all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in ad-
miralty." FED. R. Crv. P. 1. These rules do not retain the old admiralty designations. The
terms remain useful to distinguish an admiralty action from an action brought on the
civil side of the federal court and are so used in this article.
2528 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
2 6 The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 (1865). The court held that a ship-to-
shore tort was non-maritime, a ruling which Congress has since reversed. See Act for the
Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction, 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
27 See Campbell v. H. Hackfield & Co., 125 Fed. 696 (9th Cir. 1903); see also 1
BmamnicT, AinuTA~.Y § 127, at 351 (6th ed. 1940).
28 Wemstem v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758, 1965 A.M.C. 2258 (3d Cir.),
affirming 203 F Supp. 430, 1963 A.M.C. 1450 (E.D. Pa. 1962), cert. dened, 375 U.S.
940 (1963); Horton v. J. & J. Aircraft, Inc., 257 F Supp. 120 (S.D. Fla. 1966); Mont-
gomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F Supp. 447, 1965 A.M.C. 1622 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F Supp. 929, 1965 A.M.C. 2305 (D. Del.
1962); Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F Supp. 856, 1962 A.M.C. 1789
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
29 316 F.2d 758, 1965 A.M.C. 2258 (3d Cir. 1963).
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the alleged wrong. The court of appeals rejected this contention and
held that "if the tort occurred on navigable waters nothing more
is required" for the assertion of admiralty ]urisdiction.30
In contrast to the operational difficulties of an airplane, few activ-
ities are more intrinsically maritime than the building and sale of
ships. Nonetheless, the contracts governing such transactions are con-
sidered nonmaritime m the jurisdictional sense and thus beyond ad-
miralty's ken.3i On the other hand, contracts for the repair of vessels
are maritime,32 as are contracts involving the furnshing of supplies,
$3
equipment3 4 or other necessaries 5 to a ship or boat.
In the typical products liability action both tort and contract
theories are often advanced in support of the defendants alleged
liability, z.e., negligence and breach of warranty 36 The different bases
for determining the existence of tort and contract jurisdiction in
adnralty here become significant. Assuming the tort is maritime, the
80316 F.2d at 761, 1965 A.M.C. at 2261. (Footnote omitted.) Jurisdiction in
admiralty has been held to exist for m]unes occurring over navigable waters. Notanan
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F Supp. 874, 1966 A.M.C. 1384 (W.D. Pa. 1965)
(passenger injured while leaving airplane restroom during flight from Pittsburgh to
Rome); D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways, 259 F.2d 493, 1959 A.M.C. 2639
(2d Cir. 1958) (passenger on New York-Puerto Rico flight died four days after un-
scheduled but otherwise normal landing at Norfolk; plaintiff alleged death was caused
from shock induced by announcement of landing). In Davis v. Jacksonville Beach, 251
F Supp. 327, 1966 A.M.C. 1231 (M.D. Fla. 1965), admiralty jurisdiction was held to
include the claim of a swimmer struck by a curl-shooting surfer. The court solemnly
observed that "a surfboard operates exclusively on the high seas and navigable
waters, and potentially can interfere with trade and commerce. For tbis reason,
admiralty should develop the rules of liability relating to a surfboard's operation:' Id.
at 328, 1966 A.M.C. at 1232. But see McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F Supp. 866,
1962 A.M.C. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (no admiralty jurisdiction over claim of bather who
injured hand on submerged object while swimming in water adjacent to municipal beach
bordering New York Harbor).
31People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 393 (1857) (slpbuilding con-
tracts); Grand Banks Fishing Co. v. Styron, 114 F Supp. 1, 1953 A.M.C. 2172 (S.D.
Me. 1953); The Ada, 250 Fed. 194 (2d Cir. 1918) (ship-sale contracts). Neither of
these rules has much theoretical justification. See Comment, Admiralty Jurtsdiction and
Shp-Sale Contracts, 6 STAN. L. Rxv. 540 (1954). The rule that shipbuilding contracts
are nonmaritime applies as well to the agreements of subcontractors who furnish equip-
ment to a new vessel. Roach v. Chapman, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 129 (1859).
32 North Pao. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Co., 249 U.S. 119, 128-29 (1919); The General
Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819).
3 3 Munson Line, Inc. v. Vervliet, 39 F Supp. 945, 1941 A.M.C. 959 (E.D.N.Y.
1941).
34 The Mountaineer, 286 Fed. 913, 1923 A.M.C. 993 (9th Cir. 1923).
35 Luckenback [sic] S.S. Co. v. Ruddy Fumigant Co., 11 F Supp. 390, 1935 A.M.C.
899 (W.D. Wash. 1935).
36 E.g., Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F Supp. 447, 1965 A.M.C.
1622 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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warranty action, to the extent it is considered ex contractu in char-
acter, may be nonmaritime and therefore jurisdictionally defective
3 7
McKee v. Brunswick Corp.8 illustrates this problem. There the owner
of a yacht and his passenger-guests were injured as the result of an
explosion and fire which occurred during the course of a pleasure
cruise on the navigable waters of Lake Michigan near Chicago. They
commenced libels against the retailer from whom the owner had
purchased the boat, as well as against her manufacturer and the
maker of a coil which assertedly was the cause of the explosion. Negli-
gence on the part of each defendant was alleged by all of the libelants.
Because the simplistic locality test for tort jurisdiction was clearly
satisfied the negligence actions were properly brought in admiralty,
and after trial the coil maker and the boat builder were found to
have been negligent. The retailer, assertedly having no duty to inspect
or test, was absolved from liability based on negligence. The yacht
owner had, however, in addition to his negligence count, alleged a
breach of warranty by the retailer. Liability was imposed under this
theory upon the ground that the yacht "in the condition delivered was
mamiently and inherently dangerous while it was being used for the
purpose expressed" by the buyer.8 9 Since the warranty theory was
relied on only by the boat buyer and was directed solely against the
retailer this cause of action was clearly conceived as one founded on
the contract for the sale of the boat. We have seen, however, that
such a contract is nonmaritime, 40 and the court therefore had no juris-
diction of the owner's action against the retailer to the extent it was
considered contractual in nature.4'
37 Conversely, a tort may be nonmaritime, but may have resulted from the breach
of a maritime contract. See Thomson v. Chesapeake Yacht Club, Inc., 255 F Supp. 555,
1965 A.M.C. 2442 (D. Md. 1965), supplemental opinion, 255 F Supp. 559, 1966 A.M.C.
2275 (1966).
38 354 F.2d 577, 1966 A.M.C. 344 (7th Cir. 1965).
39 Id. at 579, 1966 A.M.C. at 346.
40 In American Car & Foundry Co. v. Brassert, 61 F.2d 162, 1932 A.M.C. 1524 (7th
Cir., 1932), aff'd, 289 U.S. 261, 1933 A.M.C. 749 (1933), recovery was sought against a
yacht builder by the vessel's purchaser for injuries resulting when an explosion occurred
while the boat was being operated on Lake Michigan. The Seventh Circuit observed: 'It
has been repeatedly held that the manufacture of boats is not a maritime enterprise
It must be bome in mind that the gist of the action is direct negligence in con-
struction, equipment, and inspection, a failure of duty which, so far as liability is con-
cerned, is in no way connected with maritime enterprises " 61 F.2d at 165, 1932
A.M.C. at 1529 (dictum). The problem of contract ]unsdiction was thus noted, but the
existence of tort jurisdiction was overlooked.
41 On the tort/contract distinction see generally PNossER, ToRTs §§ 93-95 (3d ed.
1964).
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A similar jurisdictional problem was present in Weinstein v. East-
ern Airlines, Inc., 42 but did not go unnoticed. Supplementary to the
negligence counts, claims involving breach of contract and of war-
ranty were made against the defendants. The court held that "a con-
tract or warranty relating to the anframe or power plant of a land-
based aircraft and a contract of carnage by air between two cities on
the United States mainland are not maritime m substance," and clais
arising from them "are not justiciable in admiralty"43 The dismissal
of these causes of action was therefore affirmed.44
Had the jurisdictional issue been raised in McKee, the operation
of the ship-sale rule would have resulted in dismissal of the contract
cause of action.45 However, either of two alternatives could have been
chosen by the court to avoid this result. On the one hand, the non-
maritime classification of ship-sale contracts might have been exposed
as an example of jurisprudential logomachy and the rule cast over-
board to join other jurisdiction-restricting jetsam.46 On the other hand,
the easier course might have been to dissociate the owner's breach of
warranty count from the contract of sale and to characterize the action
as one seeking to impose strict liability in tort independent of any
liability which might have been predicated on the sales contract.
Once the retailer's conduct in selling a defective boat is viewed as
tortious the jurisdictional question disappears because the locality
test can be applied and satisfied. This approach was adopted in Mont-
gomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Go.,47 where an action for the
wrongful death of several servicemen was brought against the manu-
facturer of a navy dirigible48 which crashed into the Atlantic Ocean.
The crash allegedly was caused by the leaking of gas from defective
seams in the inflated bag. Breach of warranty allegations were in-
eluded in the libel and were challenged on jurisdictional grounds. The
court acknowledged that its contract jurisdiction was doubtful be-
42316 F.2d 758, 1965 A.M.C. 2258 (3d Cir. 1963).
43 316 F.2d at 766, 1965 A.M.C. at 2270.
44 Ibtd.
45 Wemstem v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758, 1965 A.M.C. 2258 (3d Cir.
1963).
40 For example, the rule established in The Steam-Boat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 428 (1925), that admiralty ]unsdiction extends only to waters within the
ebb and flow of the tide was overruled in The Propeller Genesee Clef, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 443 (1851), and the rule that ship-to-shore torts are nonmaritime, The Plymouth,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865), was abolished by Congress, § 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46
U.S.C. § 740 (1964).
47231 F Supp. 447, 1965 A.M.C. 1622 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
48 The manufacturer of an allegedly defective warning device was also named as a
defendant. Tbd.
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cause of the noinaritime nature of the contract for the construction
of the dirigible, but noted that "the recent trend in personal injury
and death cases based on warranty has been to treat the action as
one in the nature of tort, ignoring contract considerations."49 Natu-
rally, "if considered tort, admiralty clearly has ]urisdiction."50 Some-
thing like this approach was employed in McKee to overcome a
vaguely analogous problem. At the conclusion of the trial the district
court refused to permit the injured passengers to amend their libel
to allege that the retailer's "warranty" extended to them as well as
the boat owner. Noting that the Illinois Supreme Court in Suvada v.
White Motor Co.51 had recently decided "that product liability for
a defective product sounds in tort," the court of appeals held "that
the seller also is liable to all injured by the defective product."
52
Accordingly, the judgment in favor of the retailer and against the
passengers was reversed, with directions to enter judgment in their
favor.53 The judgment in favor of the owner and against the retailer
was affrmed because, although "this judgment was on implied war-
ranty theory, we see no necessity of reversing to substitute product
liability theory since there would be no need of change of proof for
the latter."5 Solution of the jurisdictional problem in McKee would
have required no more subtlety in approach than that employed in
disposing of the pleading problem.5
McKee illustrates a jurisdictional dilemma confronting the plain-
tiff in prosecuting an admiralty products liability action. However,
he is not alone in this respect. The defendant also may be confronted
with an analogous problem if the injured plaintiff names in his action
only one of two or more potential defendants and the one selected
thereafter seeks to shift liability to a third party In Reichert Towing
49 Id. at 454, 1965 A.M.C. at 1631. (Footnote omitted.)
5o ld. at 454, 1965 A.M.C. at 1632.
5132 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). It is not clear whether the Seventh Cir-
cuit adopted or followed this decision. The difference is of some importance. See dis-
cussion under "Choice of Law Aspects," infra p. 839.
52 354 F.2d at 583, 1966 A.M.C. at 352.
53 Id. at 584, 1966 A.M.C. at 353.
54 Id. at n.7.
55 Compare The S.S. Samovar, 72 F Supp. 574, 1947 A.M.C. 1046 (N.D. Cal.
1947). A longshoreman was injured as a result of a defect in the cargo rigging of a new
vessel. Among others he sued the shipbuilder. The court held that even if libelant were
a third-party beneficiary of the builder's contractual obligation to construct a nondefec-
five ship, he had no right cognizable in admiralty because the construction contract was
nonmaritime. However, libelant was allowed to proceed against the shipbuilder in tort
on a negligence theory. Cf. Halliburton Co. v. Norton Drilling Co., 302 F.2d 431, 1963
A.M.C. 2169 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963).
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Line, Inc. v. Long Island Mach. & Marine Constr Co.56 the respon-
dent had contracted to install a cylinder in libelant's tugboat within
a specified time. A contract for the cylinder's manufacture was made
by the respondent with another concern. Installation was not accom-
plished until after the expiration of the agreed time, and the cylinder
burst soon thereafter. The frustrated tugboat owner brought an action
in admiralty which named only the installer as a respondent. The
manufacturer of the cylinder could also have been nominated by the
libelant on the theory that it might have been negligent in the fabrica-
tion of the cylinder.5 7 The possibility of shifting liability to another
was not lost on the installer, and it attempted to bring in the manu-
facturer as a third party respondent, alleging that the latter had im-
pliedly warranted the cylinder to be nondefective. The court blocked
this attempt, holding that the installer's contract with the manufac-
turer was nonmaritime and that the breach of warranty action was
not within the court's admiralty jurisdiction.5 8 The cross-action was
therefore dismissed, and the lone respondent left to seek relief n an-
other forum. The inefficiency of requiring two separate actions is
apparent, but in view of the special nature of admiralty's jurisdiction
such a result is probably unavoidable.5 9
Choice of Law Aspects
Given the existence of a maritime tort or the breach of a maritime
contract the federal admiralty court becomes an available foruam.60
Since the jurisdictional grant is not exclusive61 the maritime pre-
56287 Fed. 269 (E.D.N.Y. 1922).
57 Assuming, of course, that the customary elements of a maritime tort were present.
Today a breach of warranty count would probably be included, but in 1922 the ap-
pearance of such an allegation would have been unlikely.
58 287 Fed. at 270; accord, The Wonder, 79 F.2d 312, 1935 A.M.C. 1310 (2d Cir.
1935), Capital Transp. Co. v. J. C. Thelning, 167 F Supp. 379, 1960 A.M.C. 2473
(E.D.S.C. 1958).
59 Under the new federal rules, "when a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime
claim . the defendant as a tird-party plaintiff, may bring in a third-party de-
fendant who may be liable, either to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff, by
way of remedy over, contribution, or otherwise on account of the same transaction, oc-
currence, or series of transactions or occurrences." FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c). From a prac-
tical standpoint the problem in Rewchert has thus been largely alleviated, except where
the third-party plaintiff attempts to assert an in rem claim, in which case admiralty
jurisdiction must be shown. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 14(a). Where an admiralty court has
obtained jurisdiction it will not, except in a case for limitation of liability, dispose of
nonmaritime matters for the purpose of doing complete justice after the manner of a
court in equity. American Hawaiian Ventures, Inc. v. M. V J. Latuharhary, 257 F Supp.
622, 1966 A.M.C. 1363 (D.N.J. 1966).
60 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
61 See text at note 18 supra.
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fix does not preclude, as an alternative, the bringing of a diversity
action in a federal court or an ordinary civil action in a state court,
and it is of course possible that all three forums may be available.
Selection of the source of the substantive law to be applied is a task
which must be faced sooner or later by each of these forums once
their individual jurisdictional requirements have been satisfied. For
present purposes a brief sketch will provide the perspective required
to achieve meaningful focus in the context now under review
"That we have a maritime law of our own, operative throughout
the United States, cannot be doubted."62 This law consists of two
parts. One is the corpus of traditional rules and concepts governing
maritime matters adopted from the European authorities and subse-
quently adapted to fit the needs of this country 6 3 Search for an
analogy need go only as far as the American common law, rooted
in English history but developed in the courts of the individual states.
The second part consists of acts of Congress altering and supple-
mentmg the maritime law 4 If a maritime rule of law exists (Judge-
made or statutory) which is applicable to an issue arising in a mari-
time action, it must be applied regardless of the forum where the
action is being litigated.65 If there is no applicable maritime rule, the
court must apply state law or fashion a new rule of maritime law 66
"In the field of maritime contracts as in maritime torts, the National
Government has left much regulatory power in the states."T Criteria
for exercise of the choice between creation of new law and abdication
in favor of existing state law are vague. "[T]he process is one of
accommodation, entirely familiar in many areas of overlapping state
and federal concern, or a process somewhat analogous to the normal
conflict of laws situation where two sovereignties assert divergent
interests in a transaction as to which both have some concern."" It is
6 2 The Lottawana, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574 (1874).
63 Id. at 574-76. To Mr. Justice Holmes, himself an old soldier and not a man of
the sea, the notion that there emsted a comprehensive body of maritime law was so
much bilgewater: "The maritime law is not a corpus lumn-it is a very limited body of
customs and ordinances of the sea." Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 220
(1916) (dissenting opimon).
64 Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 385-87, 1924 A.M.C. 551, 555-57 (1924).
65 Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 1942 A.M.C. 1645 (1942)
(state rule that burden is on plaintiff to overcome a release cannot be applied m face of
maritime rule placing burden on defendant to sustain it).
66 Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 1955 A.M.C. 467
(1955).
67tId. at 313, 1955 A.M.C. at 471. (Footnotes omitted.)
68 Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739, 1961 A.M.C. 833, 840 (1961).
Cf. Umon FishCo. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 (1918).
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easier to illustrate the process of accommodation than to explain it. For
example, state rules concerning branch banlng,69 domestic rela-
tions,70 disposition of lost or abandoned property,71 the payment of
overtime wages72 and the effect of warranties made by an insured in
a contract of marine insurance73 have been held to apply in the ab-
sence of maritime law governing those subjects. On the other hand,
state law does not control the enforceability of an oral contract be-
tween a seaman and his employer 7 4 the effect of indemnity provisions
in a stevedoring agreement,75 the validity of an exculpatory clause in
a boat repair contract 76 or the measure of the duty owed by a ship-
owner to a crewmember's guest.77 Nor can it be substituted for the
maritime rule that contributory negligence can be considered only
in mitigation of damages and not as bar to recovery 
78
A maritime products liability case is essentially a species of the
maritime tort or maritime contract genera, and from the standpoint
of determining the source of the substantive law to be applied no
particular significance attaches to such an action simply because it
may involve a products liability situation. The distinctive feature of
many products liability actions involves the effort to widen the range
of plaintiffs who may be entitled to relief from any given defendant
and at the same time to increase the number of defendants who may
be liable to a specific plaintiff. To accomplish these aims established
concepts of liability must often be expanded, limiting concepts re-
69 Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 341 F.2d 50, 1965
A.M.C. 234 (2d Cir. 1965).
70 Bell v. Tug Shrike, 332 F.2d 330, 1964 A.M.C. 2396 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 844 (1964).
71 Kalyvakis v. The T.S.S. Olympia, 181 F Supp. 32, 1960 A.M.C. 2399 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
72 Sorensen v. City of New York, 202 F.2d 857, 1953 A.M.C. 614 (2d Cir. 1953),
cert. dented, 347 U.S. 951 (1954).
73 Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 1955 A.M.C. 467
(1955).
74 Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 1961 A.M.C. 833 (1961); Hellenic
Lines, Ltd. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 340 F.2d 398, 1965 A.M.C. 51 (2d Cir. 1965).
75 Koninklyke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maalschappy, N.Y v. Strachan Shipping
Co., 301 F.2d 741, 1962 A.M.C. 1365 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 921 (1962);
A/S J. Ludwig Mowmckels Reden v. Commercial Stevedoring Co., 256 F.2d 227, 1958
A.M.C. 1563 (2d Cir. 1958), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 801 (1958).
76 Hall-Scott Motor Car Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 122 F.2d 531, 1941 A.M.C. 1646
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 690 (1941).
77 Kermarec v. Compagme Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 1959 A.M.C.
597 (1959).
78 Ibid. Cf. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 1954 A.M.C. 1 (1953); The
Max Moms, 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
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moved and new theories developed. For tins reason a maritime rule
of law adequate to cover the issues raised in a products liability action
may be lacking and the court will therefore have to fashion one or
rely on state law By and large 9 this option has been nplicitlys or
explicitlys exercised in favor of the creation of maritime law For
example, the Fourth Circuit in Whorton v. T A. Loving & Co. 2 had
to decide whether lack of privity barred a claim against a bridge
contractor which arose from the sinking of libelant's boat on the North
Carolina portion of the intercoastal waterway after it struck a sub-
merged piling which the contractor had failed to remove. The court
held that lack of privity was not a bar and observed: "North Carolina
does not appear to be among the states which have adopted the
"modern' view applied to contractors. However, the instant case in-
volves a maritime tort and the rights of the parties must be determined
by general maritime principles and not state law" 3 This syllogistic
approach has merit where the injury has a genuine "salty flavor."84
79This inexact, qualification is necessary because a few courts have applied state
law to maritime cases in apparent unawareness of the significance of such application.
In McKee v. Brnnswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577, 1966 A.M.C. 344 (7th Cir. 1965) the
court applied the Illinois Sales Act and appeared to follow a decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court, but did not discuss the relation between state law and maritime law.
Compare United States v. Whitin Machine Works, 79 F Supp. 351, 1948 A.M.C. 1807
(D. Mass. 1948). In Brooks v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 253 F Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga.
1966) an action based on diversity was brought against the airline and the aircraft
manufacturer for alleged wrongful death resulting from the crash of a plane into Lake
Pontchartrain, Louisiana. Despite the fact that the waters of this lake are navigable
and within the jurisdiction of admiralty, Coleman v. Jahncke Service, Inc., 341 F.2d
956, 1965 A.M.C. 535 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 974 (1966); see D'Albora
v. Garcia, 1962 A.M.C. 2525 (La. Ct. of App. 1962), the decision contains no
mention of the maritime aspects of the action. Complete confusion results when the
principle of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), is applied to a maritime action
brought on the civil side of the federal court. Compare Sevits v. McKiernan Terry Corp.,
264 F Supp. 810, 1966 A.M.C. 1953 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), with Central American Shipping
& Trading Corp. v. Mercantile Ship Repair Co., 73 F Supp. 779, 1947 A.M.C. 399
(E.D.N.Y. 1947). See generally Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform
General Maritime Law, 64 HAiv. L. RBv. 246 (1950).
80 China Umon Lines, Ltd., S.A. v. A. 0. Andersen & Co., 364 F.2d 769, 1966
A.M.C. 1653 (5th Cir. 1966); Midwest Marine, Inc. v. Sturgeon Bay Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co., 247 F Supp. 283 (E.D. Wis. 1965); Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 231 F Supp. 447, 1965 A.M.C. 1622 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
81 Whorton v. T. A. Loving & Co., 344 F.2d 739, 1965 A.M.C. 2219 (4th Cir.
1965); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F Supp. 929, 1965 A.M.C. 2305 (D. Del.
1962).
82 Supra note 81.
83 Id. at 745, 1965 A.M.C. at 2228.
84 This phrase was used by Mr. Justice Harlan in Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365
U.S. 731, 742, 1961 A.M.C. 833, 842 (1961), to distinguish the fact situation there
from the one in Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 1955
A.M.C. 467 (1955).
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However, as the aircraft cases illustrate, many injuries are maritime
only in the jurisdictional sense. More extreme cases will inevitably
arise. The defect in the yachtsman's portable television set will cause
an injury while being used aboard his vessel; the cigar in the bottle of
soft drink will be consumed in the family sailboat. Clearly, there is a
minimal national interest in the application of uniform federal rules
to resolve liabilities customarily adjudicated in accordance with
state law standards. Can tis result be avoided without altering long-
established jurisdictional patterns?
One solution might be to distinguish between quasi-maritime in-
juries and those with some genuine maritime connection; state law
could be applied to the former and federal law to the latter. Against
the adoption of such a distinction it can be argued that the tasks of
determining what injuries are genuinely maritime and of ascertaining
and applying state law to those which are not would be burdensome.
These arguments are specious. Differentiation between maritime and
quasi-maritme injuries could be accomplished by using conceptual
criteria analogous to those employed in distinguishing maritime from
nonmaritime contracts. A state court presumably would have no dif-
culty in applying its law85 nor in applying that of another state if
customary conflict of laws principles so dictated, and the federal courts,
as a result of the Erie doctrine, 6 are also accustomed to applying state
law 87 It can also be argued that some state rules (such as denial of
recovery to the plaintiff who has been contributorily negligent) are
antagoistic and repugnant to fundamental admiralty precepts. How-
ever, these precepts were created to deal with intrinsically maritime
injuries, not with those fortuitously maritime, and the interests of per-
sons traditionally protected by the maritime law would not be jeopar-
dized by the application of state law
85 'This may be a rebuttable presumption. See Franklin, When Worlds Collide:
Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. 11Ev. 974
(1966).
86 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
87 Since contracts for the sale of ships are considered nonmaritime, state law is ap-
plicable to disputes arising out of such contracts. Bulkley v. Honold, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
390 (1857); Wilken v. Holland, 343 F.2d 147, 1965 A.M.C. 1996 (4th Cir. 1965). The
Supreme Court has never passed directly on the question whether ship-sale contracts
are nonmaritime. See Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Ship-Sale Contracts, 6 STAN.
L. REv. 540 (1954). The fact that state law has for so long been applied to such con-
tracts should be no barrier to their designation as maritime, since state law could con-
tinue to be applied. See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310,
1955 A.M.C. 467 (1955). Cf. James Stewart & Co. v. Rivara, 274 U.S. 614, 1927 A.M.C.
939 (1927).
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Substantive Bases of Maritime Products Liability
For present purposes it will be assumed that jurisdictional and
choice of law perils have been weathered and that a products liability
fact situation exists to which maritime law is applicable. We therefore
have reached consideration of the following question: by what stan-
dards is the defendant held to answer in damages to the plaintiff in
a maritime products liability case?
Negligence
The basic principle that everyone must use reasonable care to
minimize the risk of possible injury to others, i.e., not be negligent,
has been as much a part of the maritime law8 as it has been of the
common law 8 9 There exists no inherent limitation to the concept of
negligence as a standard for the imposition of liability which prevents
its application to the products liability context,90 although difficulties
may be encountered in determining the extent of the duty of care owed
and the class of persons who fall within its ambit. 1 And yet, for reasons
not clearly understood,92 both the common law and the maritime law
employed for a time a highly artificial rule which served to limit the
normal operation of negligence principles as applied to products lia-
bility cases and their analogs. The name of the rule was "privity"
The requirement of privity of contract as a condition for the main-
tenance of a tort action for negligence where the alleged liability of
the defendant appeared to lie in the breach of an obligation assumed
by contract became established in the common law primarily as a
result of the widespread misinterpretation of the decision of the Ex-
chequer Chamber in Winterbottom v. Wright.93 The defendant had
contracted with the postmaster general to supply and maintain a mail
coach. The postmaster general had a separate contract with plaintiff's
employer, who had agreed to farmsh a driver for the coach. Plaintiff
(the driver farinshed pursuant to that contract) sought to recover
for personal injuries received when the coach broke down while he
S8 See Robinson, Legal Adjustments of Personal Injury m the Maritime Industry, 44
HAv. L. REv. 223, 234 (1930).
89 See Phelps, Extent of Manufacturer's Duty of Care to Persons Other Than the
Immediate Purchaser, 2 JoHN MARHALL L.Q. 387 (1937).
90 See PRossEa, TORTs § 96 (3d ed. 1964).
91 E.g., Simpson Timber Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 1966 A.M.C. 1081, ret'd on re-
hearing, 369 F.2d 324, 1966 A.M.C. 2704 (9th Cir. 1966); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp.,
342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964), affirming 219 F Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1963).
92 See Nossim, ToRTs § 96 (3d ed. 1964).
9310 M. & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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was driving it and he was thrown from his seat. His declaration was
in case and alleged that the breakdown occurred as a result of "certain
latent defects and from no other cause ,,9 Defendant's
liability assertedly arose because he "so improperly and negligently
conducted himself, and so utterly disregarded his . contract [to
furmsh a mail coach] ",95 No negligence apart from the breach
of contract was alleged, nor did the declaration state that the defen-
dant knew or ought to have known of the latent defects. Viewed in
the context of a judicial system which then delighted in procedural
techticalittes, the court's decision holds no more than that the decla-
ration failed to state a cause of action because the basis of the defen-
dant's alleged wrong to the plaintiff lay solely in the breach of con-
tract to which plaintiff was not a party 9 6 But defendant's counsel had
argued the matter on a much grander scale. He foresaw that "the
most alarming consequences would follow the adoption of such a
principle," 7 not the least of which would be the foundering of the
courts in a heavy sea of maritime products liability litigation. "[I]f the
chain-cable of an East Indiaman were to break, and the vessel went
aground, every person affected, either in person or property, by the
accident, might have an action against the manufacturer, and perhaps
against every seller also of the iron.""" This forensic parade of nautical
horribles apparently had its effect on the court. Lord Abinger appre-
hended "the most absurd and outrageous consequences" would ensue
"unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the par-
ties who entered into them."99 Baron Alderson agreed, suggesting
ominously that "if we go one step beyond , there is no reason
why we should not go fifty 1 0
Despite the narrowness of its actual holding, Winterbottom v.
Wright came to stand for the broad proposition that a supplier of a
defective chattel was liable for injuries caused by the defect only to
a person in privity of contract with him.1°1 So stated, the rule became
94 Id. at 110, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403.
95 Ibid.
06 See Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 588-89 (Scot.); Bohlen, The
Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 44 Am. L. REG., N.S. 209, 280-85,
289-310 (1905).
97 10 M. & W at 111, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403.
98 Ibid.
99 Id. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
100 Id. at 115, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405. Baron Rolfe was sympathetic toward the
plaintiff, "but by that consideration we ought not to be influenced. Hard cases are
apt to introduce bad law." Id. at 116, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405-06.
101 See PnossER, ToRTs § 96 (3d ed. 1964).
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generally applied in the United States, 0 2 and seepage of the privity
requirement into admiralty and maritime law was probably inevitable.
In The Germanza'03 the maritime counterpart of the English mail
coach driver was a gram bag handler employed by a stevedore com-
pany which had been engaged by the gram shipper to bag the cargo
for carnage in accordance with the reqirements of the shipper's
contract with the slpowner. Plaintiff performed his work in the
vessel's 'tween decks, and he was injured when he fell through an
open and unguarded hatchway The court dismissed his libel in rem
against the Germania on the ground that "there was no contract be-
tween any one representing the vessel and the libellant, and there was
was no duty to the libellant on the part of the officers and crew of
the vessel."10 4 A similar approach was adopted in The Mary Stewart,0 5
where recovery was denied for injuries received when a cargo line,
furnished by the shipowner to the charterer pursuant to the charter
party, parted, and a bale of cotton dropped on the libelant, an em-
ployee of the stevedore firm hired by the charterer. Winterbottom v.
Wright was cited for the proposition that "where a party is delinquent
in a duty imposed by contract, no one but a party to the contract can
maintain an action."10 6 Libelant was therefore deprived of recourse
against the vessel because he was not privy to the charter party
pursuant to which the shipowner had furnished the line.
Almost as soon as the privity rule was laid down the common law
courts began efforts to scuttle it. In Thomas v. Winchester'07 a drug
wholesaler who negligently labeled a bottle containing the poison
belladonna as "dandelion extract" was held liable for injuries sustained
by the ultimate consumer because such negligence had "put human
life in imminent danger," 08 and defendant therefore owed plaintiff
a duty of care not dependent on the existence of any contractual rela-
tionslp. Winterbottom v. Wright' 9 and its progeny were distin-
guished on the basis that "no such imminent danger existed in those
cases."" 0 Maritime adoption of the "imminent danger" exception to
102 See Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865, 867-70 (8th Cir.
1903).
103 10 Fed. Cas. 255 (No. 5360) (S.D.N.Y. 1878).
104 Id. at 257.
105 10 Fed. 137 (E.D. Va. 1881) (dictum); see also The Noranmore, 113 Fed. 367,
369 (E.D. Va. 1902).
106 The Mary Stewart, 10 Fed. 137, 139 (E.D. Va. 1881).
107 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
108 Id. at 409.
109 10 M. & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
110 6 N.Y. at 409.
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the pnvity requirement occurred m Gerrity v. The Bark Kate Cann.",
The Kate Cann was an English vessel under charter to receive and
transport a cargo of gram. Libelant was one of several persons who
had been hired by the gram elevator company to trim the cargo as
it came into the hold. During the course of loading the braces sup-
porting a quantity of dunnage which had been stowed m the 'tween
decks gave way and the dunnage fell on the libelant, seriously mjurmg
him. The court held that the weight of the mass and its position m a
space where men were at work made the structure dangerous to life.
The case therefore fell "within the principle of Thomas v. Win-
chester," and the shipowner owed libelant a duty to see that the dun-
nage was properly secured. 12
In the context of actions by stevedores for mjuries received as a
result of hazards encountered aboard ship, the emphasis m Gerrity
on the shipowner's duty harbmgered not the increasing use of excep-
tions to the maritime privity rule, but its abolition altogether. In
Coughlin v. The Rheola1 13 plaintiff stevedore was injured when a
chain link parted, permitting a tub of iron ore to fall and strike him.
Lack of privity was asserted as a defense, to which the court re-
sponded:
[T]here was no pnvity but this does not in the least affect
the obligation of the master [acting for the shipowner] not to be
negligent towards the libelant, or the degree of care winch it was
recumbent upon him to exercise [The exercise of due care] im-
plies the use of such vigilance as is proportional to the danger to
be avoided, judged by the standard of common prudence and ex-
penence.114
The court found negligence in the master's failure to make a careful
examination of the chain and, accordingly, sustained the libelant's
action against the vessel.
These early maritime bouts with privity were ignored in other
factual contexts which arose at later times, perhaps because in the
interval appeared the decision m MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,'
Plaintiff's negligence action against the manufacturer of an auto-
mobile sold by the maker to a dealer and then to the plaintiff for
111 2 Fed. 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1880).
112 Id. at 245. For a more recent review of the vessel owner's obligations to a gram
loading longshoreman, see Chaney v. City of Galveston, 368 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1966).
113 19 Fed. 926 (C.C.N.Y. 1884).
114Id. at 927; accord, The Wynenc, 156 Fed. 276 (D. Ore. 1907); Walsh v. The
Win. F Babcock, 31 Fed. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1887).
115217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916).
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injuries when a wheel spoke crumbled into fragments, throwing plain-
tiff out of the car, was challenged on the ground that an automobile
was not inherently dangerous within the principle of Thomas v. Win-
chester 16 and that lack of privity therefore barred an action against
the manufacturer. Justice Cardozo's celebrated opinion dispatched
these contentions:
[TJhe pnnciple of Thomas v. Winchester is not limited to
things which in their normal operation are implements of destruc-
tion. If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in danger when negligently made, it is then a
thing of danger. If to the element of danger there is added
knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the pur-
chaser, and without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it care-
fully We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard
life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen,
grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the
obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in the law 117
The adoption by other courts of the philosophy expressed in the
MacPherson decision and the expansion of its holding, viewed ongi-
nally as an enlargement of the field of exceptions to the privity rule,"'8
into a rationale for the total abolition of the privity requirement is
well known and has been exhaustively commented upon. 19 Adoption
of the MacPherson principle into maritime law occurred in a decision
which is known principally for its holding extending the seaworthiness
doctrine1 20 to include a longshoreman performing seaman's work:
Sierackz v. Seas Shipping Co.121 Plaintiff longshoreman was engaged
m loading certain heavy-lift cargo into a vessel whose construction
had been completed a year and a half previously A ten-ton boom,
which had not previously been used, was rigged to lift the cargo.
When installed the boom had been tested by using it to lift a dead
weight of twelve and a half tons. During the loading operation the
3166 N.Y. 397 (1852).
117 217 N.Y. at 389-90, 111 N.E. at 1053.
118 See 16 COLtuh. L. REv. 428 (1916); 25 YALE L.J. 679 (1916).
119 E.g., Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors, 10 MmN. L. REv.
1 (1925); James, Products Liability, 34 TExAs L. REv. 192 (1955); Prosser, The As-
sault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960);
Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CALw. L. REv. 614, 809 (1955).
120 Under the original formulation of the doctrine the shipowner was held strictly
liable for injuries occurring to seamen as a result of the unseaworthiness of the vessel.
See, e.g., Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 1944 A.M.C. 1 (1944).




shackle which supported the boom broke because of a defect in the
metal. Certain available, but unperformed, tests would have disclosed
the presence of the defect before the shackle's installation. As a result
the boom and its tackle fell, and plaintiff was struck and injured. He
libeled the vessel, her owner and her builder.
In affirming the negligence liability of the shipbuilder on the
ground that the exercise of reasonable care required the performance
of more searching tests than the one accomplished the court of ap-
peals observed that "the principles of MacPherson are broadly
applicable, that law having become so widely accepted as to be con-
strued as a part of the general law of torts, maritime as well as com-
mon law "122
Despite such inroads defendants continued to advance the privity
argument in areas where it had not clearly been rejected. Recovery
for property damage resulting when a boom block broke was sought
from the block maker in Todd Shipyards Corp. v. United States,
123
on the ground that the block had been negligently constructed. Privity
of contract was lacking, since the block had not been purchased from
the manufacturer by the libelant, but had been furnished libelant by
the Navy, for whom libelant was repairing a vessel. Conceding that
exceptions to the privity rule had been made "from time to time,"
the block maker's proctors argued that nonetheless no case had held
the rule inapplicable where property damage only was alleged.12 The
court was uninpressed, finding "no reasonable ground for making a
distinction between injury to property and injury to the person.12 5
Another property damage case 26 involved cargo which was water-
soaked as a result of a shipyard's negligent failure to blank off a waste
pipe near the vessels water line. The court assumed without question
that "the shipyard was liable to cargo owners for negligence in the
repair of the vessel resulting in damage to cargo "127 More recently
122 149 F.2d at 99-100, 1945 A.M.C. at 409; accord, Noel v. United Aircraft Corp.,
342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964), rehearing denied, 342 F.2d 240 (1965); Dunn v. Wheeler
Shipbuilding Corp., 86 F Supp. 659, 1949 A.M.C. 1953 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (dictum);
The S.S. Samovar, 72 F Supp. 574, 1947 A.M.C. 1046 (N.D. Cal. 1947).
123 69 F Supp. 609, 1947 A.M.C. 204 (S.D. Me. 1947).
124 Ibid.
125 Id. at 610, 1947 A.M.C. at 205; accord, Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Harbor Side
Trading & Supply Co., 93 F Supp. 601, 1950 A.M.C. 2060 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); cf. Horan
Transp. Corp. v. Albany Asphalt & Aggregates Corp., 88 F Supp. 494, 1949 A.M.C. 2050
(N.D.N.Y. 1949).
126 Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. United States, 226 F.2d 137,
1955 A.M.C. 1973 (4th Cir. 1955).
127Id. at 142, 1955 A.M.C. at 1979 (dictum); cf. Bethlehem Slhpbuilding Corp.
v. Joseph Gutradt Co., 10 F.2d 769, 1926 A.M.C. 342 (9th Cir. 1926).
May, 1967]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
a contractor was held liable to the owner of a shrimp boat which sank
after being holed by a steel piling which the contractor had negli-
gently failed to remove from the intracoastal waterway in the course
of demolishing an existing bridge and building a new one.'28
The line of cases beginning with Sieracks v. Seas Shipping Co.
make clear that jettison of the privity rule as applied to negligence
actions has been accomplished in the maritime law. 2 9 Determination
of the negligence liability of an alleged tort-feasor to one injured
in person or property is now based upon the long-established general
principles of duty of care, foreseeability and proximate cause ° and
is unaffected by the presence or absence of a contractual relationship.
Warranty
While the word "warranty" has achieved considerable promis-
cuity in its legal usage 31 it is perhaps most closely associated with
the law of sales. The body of rules governing the sale of goods was
developed by the common law and is now largely codified." 2 From
128 Whorton v. T. A. Loving & Co., 344 F.2d 739, 1965 A.M.C. 2219 (4th Cir.
1965). The court found itself in accord with "the modern trend toward acceptance
of the view that there is no valid reason for drawing a distinction between a contractor
and a manufacturer." Id. at 745, 1965 A.M.C. at 2228. Cf. The Wonder, 79 F.2d 312,
1935 A.M.C. 1310 (2d Cir. 1935); but cf. D. M. Picton & Co. v. Eastes, 160 F.2d 189,
1947 A.M.C. 1742 (5th Cir. 1947).
129 In the recent series of admiralty actions for wrongful death ansmg from the
crash of aircraft into the high seas or navigable waters of the United States none of the
defendants (who included variously the airline, the manufacturer of the aircraft and
the manufacturer-supplier of the component part alleged to have been defective) chal-
lenged the causes of action based on negligence, although libelants' warranty claims
were vigorously contested. See Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F Supp.
447, 1965 A.M.C. 1622 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Noel v. United Aircraft Carp., 204 F Supp.
929, 1965 A.M.C. 2305 (D. Del. 1962); Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 203 F Supp.
430, 1963 A.M.C. 1450 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 316 "F.2d 758, 1965 A.M.C. 2258 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963); Middlleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F
Supp. 856, 1962 A.M.C. 1789 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Cf. McKee v. Brunswick Corp., 354
F.2d 577, 1966 A.M.C. 344 (7th Cir. 1965); Koepp v. Peters, 193 F Supp. 296, 1962
A.M.C. 1930 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
130 "The plaintiff must prove [the defendant's] negligence and that such negli-
gence is a proximate cause of his injury; furthermore, he must prove that he is within
the class protected, that is, one as to whom the consequences of negligence may be fore-
seen." Whorton v. T. A. Loving & Co., 344 F.2d 739, 746, 1965 A.M.C. 2219, 2229 (4th
Cir. 1965); accord, Simpson Timber Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 1966 A.M.C. 1081, rev'd on
rehearing, 369 F.2d 324, 1966 A.M.C. 2704 (9th Cir. 1966), Cunningham v. Bethlehem
Steel Co., 231 F Supp. 934, 1965 A.M.C. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (by Implication); cf.
Brislin v. United States, 165 F.2d 296, 1948 A.M.C. 541 (4th Cir. 1947).
131 "There is no more troublesome word in the law than the word 'warranty.' It is
constantly used in different senses. It is a common term in the law of insurance, the law
of charter parties, and the law of sales." 1 WmIusToN, SALES § 181 (3d ed. 1948).
132 E.g., UNIFOtM CO2 MRCAL CODE §§ 2-101-725.
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the products liability standpoint the most significant rules are those
dealing with express and implied warranties. An express warranty is
"any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bar-
gain."13 An implied warranty is a representation concerning the qual-
ity of the goods which the seller is held by the law to have made even
though he did not in fact do so.' The courts of England began im-
posing on the seller additional obligations of this nature in the early
nineteenth century 13 For example, in Jones v. Bright36 the defendant
manufacturer sold the plaintiff shipowner some copper sheathing for
installation on the hull of his ship, the Isabella. The copper deterio-
rated rapidly and plaintiff brought an action for breach of warranty
Although the court found that the manufacturer had breached an
express warranty to the shipowner, Chief Justice Best desired "to put
the case on a broad principle" and delivered a succinct dictum de-
fining the warranties imposed by law- "If a man sells an article, he
thereby warrants that it is merchantable-that it is fit for some pur-
pose. . If he sells it for a particular purpose, he thereby warrants
it fit for that purpose ,,137 The underlying policy basis of these non-
consensual obligations was candidly stated: they "will teach manu-
facturers that they must not ann at underselling each other by pro-
ducing goods of inferior quality, and that the law will protect pur-
chasers who are necessarily ignorant of the commodity sold."-
8
Reported American cases involving maritime sales of goods are
few Those extant, however, reveal that there is no clearly defined
maritime law of sales and that state law has frequently been the refer-
ence point for determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to a
maritime contract for the sale of goods. In The St. S. Angelo Toso139 a
libel was brought to recover the contract price of 992 tons of coal fur-
rushed respondent's vessel. The respondent pleaded a warranty as to the
quality of the coal and defended on its breach. Since the contract con-
tamed no express warranty "the sole question is therefore one of im-
plied warranty and turns on the Pennsylvania Sales Act of 1915."i40
Selection of state law was not preceded by a consideration of whether
133 Id. at § 2-313.
134 See 1 WJLUsTON, SArTs § 194 (3d ed. 1948).
135 See td. § 228.
,36 5 Bing. 533, 130 Eng. Rep. 1167 (C.P. 1829).
137d. at 544, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1172.
138 Id. at 546, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1173. Cf. Gray v. Cox, 4 B. & C. 108, 107 Eng. Rep.
999 (K.B. 1925).
139 271 Fed. 245 (3d Cir. 1921).
140 Id. at 246.
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or not maritime rules of law were or should be applicable,"' and the
choice of the Pennsylvania Sales Act was apparently the result of the
contract having been made and performed in that state.42 The court of
appeals noted, however, that the implied warranty provision of the
Pennsylvania Act "is m the exact terms of a section of the Uniform
Sales Act adopted by many states, which in turn followed quite
literally a like provision of the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893."
Having thus established the ubiquity of the warranty in question, the
court affirmed the trial judge's conclusion "that the coal, although
of merchantable quality was not reasonably fit for the purpose for
which it was required."
144
Similar treatment was given the choice of law question in Linen
Thread Co. v. Shaw.'45 There the agents of the fishing vessel Sam &
Priscilla had purchased at Boston a seine net from the libelant "to
enable the schooner to engage in the mackerel seining fisheries." 40
Libelant brought its action in the Massachusetts federal district court
to recover the purchase price, and the respondent schooner owner
filed a cross-libel alleging the net was defective in that the purse line
broke, allowing a large catch of mackerel to escape. The court stated
the applicable law thusly-
Regardless of the statute of Massachusetts, there is under the com-
mon law an implied warranty that articles supplied by a manufacturer
or dealer shall be reasonably fit for the purpose for which he kn6w
they were intended, provided -the purchaser relies upon his skill and
knowledge. The Massachusetts statute is but declaratory of thi. 47
1 4 1 Cf. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 1955 A.M.C.
467 (1955).
14 2 The coal was ordered by the shipowner at Philadelphia and delivered to the
vessel when she called there. The St. S. Angelo Toso, 265 Fed. 783 (E.D. Pa. 1920).
143 271 Fed. at 246.
144 Id. at 247. The earliest admiralty case recognizing the implied warranty of fitness
appears to be Moore v. The Charles Morgan, 17 Fed. Cas. 670 (No. 9754) (S.D. Ohio
1878).
145 9 F.2d 17, 1926 A.M.C. 67 (1st Cir. 1925).
3.46Id. at 18, 1926 A.M.C. at 68.
'47 Id. at 19, 1926 A.M.C. at 70. No citations follow the quoted passage. The im-
plied warranty of fitness was also recognized in The Nimrod, 141 Fed. 215 (S.D. Ala.
1905), aff'd per curiam, 141 Fed. 834 (5th Cir. 1906).
In The E 270, 16 F.2d 1005, 1927 A.M.C. 386 (D. Mass. 1927) respondents owned
a fishing boat engaged in flounder dragging. They purchased an engine for the boat
from libelant, who knew the employment of the vessel. The engine drove the boat satis-
factorily, but it would not handle the drag hoisting gear. In defense to libelant's action
to recover the purchase price respondents claimed breach of warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, relying on the Linen Thread Co. and St. S. Angelo Toso decisions.
The court acknowledged the argument that "on such facts a warranty of fitness
should be implied under both the Massachusetts Sales Act and at common law."
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Upon review of the evidence the court concluded that the warranty
stated was breached and that respondent was entitled to recover
damages for the lost mackerel catch.
An express warranty was involved in Condenser Service & Engi-
neenng Co., Inc. v. Companta Maritima,148 where libelant had war-
ranted that an evaporator installed in respondent's tanker would make
12 tons of fresh water per 24 hours. Instead, it made only five tons per
day In support of the holding that libelant's breach of warranty
destroyed its claim to the unpaid purchase price the district court
drew on the law of Arkansas, Alabama, Pennsylvama and the District
of Columbia, observing that "the agreement in tis case was made and
performed either in New York or New Jersey and is now sued on in
Virgina in admiralty; no point has been made that there is a differ-
ence in the law in these jurisdictions." 49
The choice of law problem also passes unnoticed in maritime ac-
tions brought on the civil side of the federal court. In Pabellon v.
Grace Line, Inc. 50 plaintiff seaman was injured aboard defendant's
vessel when an explosion followed his mixing together of three com-
mon commercial cleansers. He brought an action for damages, and the
defendant brought a third party complaint for indemnity against the
three manufacturers and each of the suppliers who had furnished the
cleansers to the vessel, alleging negligence and breach of implied
warranty Certain cross-defendants challenged the cross-complaint
on the ground that the products involved were sold under their brand
names, thereby precluding any implied warranty The district court
agreed and dismissed the cross-complamt. 51 The court of appeals
reversed, holding that even though brand-name cleansers were sold
the defendant might still be able to prove the existence of the war-
ranty claimed. 52 Although the indemnity complaint clearly was
based on a maritime contract, at least so far as the suppliers were
Id. at 1006. Nonetheless, a distinction was found "between nplymg a warranty of per-
formance under ordinary conditions, and performance under special conditions, even
though known to the seller," and the court held that "it would be going too far to
bring in by nplication a warranty that the engine would perform satisfactorily under
these special circumstances " Ibid.
148 1954 A.M.C. 1243 (E.D. Va. 1954).
149Id. at 1244. Cf. The Nuska, 300 Fed. 231 (S.D. Fla. 1924), aff'd sub nom.,
R. R. Ricou & Sons v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 11 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1926).
250 191 F.2d 169, 1951 A.M.C. 1751 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 893 (1951).
'51 Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 94 F Supp. 989, 1951 A.M.C. 812 (1950), rev'd,
191 F.2d 169, 1951 A.M.C. 1751 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 893 (1951).
152 Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 191 F.2d 169, 1951 A.M.C. 1751 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 893 (1951).
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concerned,' 53 the district court and the court of appeals viewed the
action as one involving only state law, and neither court considered
the choice of law issue raised by the maritime features present.5 4
Not surprisingly, state courts, as well as federal courts, overlook
the significance of sales cases having maritime characteristics. Thus,
state actfons involving a marine engine,15 5 an anchor windlass, 5 '
bunker oil, 157 a steamboat's boiler'58 and a net fuirmshed a fishing
vessel' 59 have all been dealt with as though they were ordinary, non-
maritime actions.
Incorporation of the widely recognized warranties of fitness and
merchantability into the maritime law has been accomplished, albeit
with a noticeable lack of jurisprudential finesse.'60 However, such
warranties in their common law or statutory environments exist as
integral parts of a relatively complex scheme of rules carefully defin-
ing and detailing the rights of buyers and sellers.' 6 There is no eqmuv-
'35 See The Electron, 48 Fed. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1891).
'54 In Consolidated Fisheries Co. v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 193 F.2d 957 (3d Cir.
1952), the court stated (dictum) that Pennsylvania law governed plaintiffs action for
damages for breach of warranty arising out of the sale of a marine diesel engine for
installation in plaintiff's fishing boat. Cf. The Nuska, 300 Fed. 231, 1924 A.M.C. 1197
(S.D. Fla. 1924), aff'd sub. nom., R. R. Ricou & Sons v. Fairbanks Morse & Co., 11 F.2d
103, 1926 A.M.C. 799 (5th Cir. 1926).
155 Lutz v Hill-Diesel Engine Co., 255 Mich. 98, 237 N.W 546 (1931).
256 Maine Elec. Co. v. General Eng'r Works, 95 Pa. Super. 397 (1929).
'57 Wemstem v. Garcia, 297 N.Y. Supp. 48 (App. Div. 1937), afJ'd sub. rom.,
Cities Serv. Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Garcia,-277 N.Y. 642, 14 N.E.2d 200 (1938).
158 Gibbens & Gordon, Inc. v. Crane Co., 15 La. App. 335, 131 So. 73 (Ct. App.
1930). Cf. The Nimrod, 141 Fed. 215 (S.D. Ala. 1905), aff'd per curiam, 141 Fed. 834
(5th Cir. 1906).
159 Puratich v. Pacific Marine Supply Co., 184 Wash. 531, 51 P.2d 1080 (1935).
160 Beyond the sale of goods and on the edge of the field of products liability lies
the nnplied warranty of workmanlike service mposed upon stevedores and ship repairers
for the benefit of shipowners. E.g., Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350
U.S. 124, 1956 A.M.C. 9 (1956); Booth S.S. Co. v. Meier & Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310,
1959 A.M.C. 1974 (2d Cir. 1958). In Ryan the Supreme Court observed that the steve-
dore's warranty "is comparable to a manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its
manufactured products." 350 U.S. at 133, 1956 A.M.C. at 17. The ease with which the
analogy is made conceals the rather complex antecedent history of the warranty in ques-
tion. See Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39
COnNELI L.Q. 381 (1954); White, A New Look at the Shipowner's Right-Over for
Shipboard Injuries, 12 STAN. L. BEv. 717 (1960). The Ryan doctrine has received fur-
ther attention from the Supreme Court in Italia Societa Per Aziom di Navigazione v.
Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315, 1964 A.M.C. 1075 (1964); Atlantic & Gulf
Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 1962 A.M.C. 565 (1962); Water-
man S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421, 1960 A.M.C. 2260 (1960);
Crumady v. The Joachn Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 1959 A.M.C. 580 (1959); Weyer-
haeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 1958 A.M.C. 501 (1958).
161 E.g., CAL. CommRm. CODE §§ 2101-2724 (1965).
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alent in the maritime law, and the comparative infrequency with
which maritime sales cases arise indicates that there will never be a
sufficient volume of litigation out of which a comprehensive body of
maritime sales law can be developed. These factors suggest that
maritime contracts for the sale of goods should be governed by the
state law which would be applicable under customary conflicts
principles.162 That such a choice would be workable is attested by
the fact that state sales law has long been applied to contracts for




Certainly the most striking development in the land law of prod-
ucts liability has been the broadened use of the implied warranties
associated with the sale of goods as a means to achieve significant
alterations in the manner in which losses from injuries resulting from
the conduct of business enterprises are allocated. 65 A similar devel-
opment is now under way in the maritime law, and most of the
impetus has come not from the sea, but the air.
In Middileton v. United Aircraft Corp.16 6 an action in admiralty was
brought under the Death on the High Seas Act 67 (DOHSA) to recover
162 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
1
6 3 E.g., Bulkley v. Honold, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 390 (1856); Wilken v. Holland, 343
F.2d 147, 1965 A.M.C. 1996 (4th Cir. 1965); Anderson Bros. v. O'Meara, 306 F.2d 672
(5th Cir. 1962). Cf. The Henry S., 4 F Supp. 953, 1933 A.M.C. 1401 (E.D. Va. 1933).
164 See Comment, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Ship-Sale Contracts, 6 STAN. L. BEv.
540 (1954).
165 The various fictions utilized by the courts in an effort to stay within the familiar
conceptual boundaries of sales law are catalogued in Gillam, Products Liability in a
Nutshell, 37 OnE. L. 1 Ev. 119, 153-55 (1958).
166 204 F Supp. 856, 1962 A.M.C. 1789 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
167 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964). Section one of the act pro-
vides in relevant part: "Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful
act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore
of any State the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for
damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty against the vessel,
person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued." 41 Stat.
537, 46 U.S.C. § 761. Questions concerning the scope of the DOHSA and the relation
between it and state law are complex, and consideration of them is beyond the scope
of this article. At this stage we are interested in the approach of the courts to warranty
and strict liability as substantive portions of the maritime law and not in the manner
in which these issues arise in a particular case. For a lucid discussion of the DOHSA see
Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F Supp. 85, 1954 A.M.C. 1697 (N.D. Cal. 1954),
which involved the crash of an airliner in the nuddle of the Pacific Ocean. Among the
issues presented in Wilson was whether or not the DOHSA applied to aircraft crashes.
The court concluded "the scope of the [DOHSA] within the geographical area of
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damages for the alleged wrongful death of a pilot and five passengers
who were killed as the result of the crash of a helicopter n the Gulf
of Mexico twenty-five miles off the coast of Louisiana. The libel
alleged, inter alia, a cause of action for breach of inplied warranty on
behalf of each of the decedents against respondent, who was the
manufacturer of the helicopter. A motion to dismiss the action was
made by United on the ground that privity was lacking between it
and libelants. The court reviewed briefly the decline in application of
the privity rule in analogous negligence actions and concluded that
"with liability of the manufacturer to one not in privity with him on
a negligence theory established, it is but one logical step forward to
allow recovery against a manufacturer on a breach of warranty
theory by one not in privity with hun." 6 8 Respondent's motion was
therefore denied.
Although United's privity contention was properly overruled by
the court the rationale for its decision was defective. The pnvity rule
as applied to actions for negligence was borrowed from the law of
contracts.' 69 In the latter context the rule followed naturally from the
simplistic belief that obligations arising from contract should be nn-
posed only on those who have expressly agreed to accept them and
that contrapuntal rights should accrue only to those who were ex-
pressly intended by the obligor to benefit from them.170 The source of
the obligation not to be negligent, however, does not derive from con-
sent, but is externally inposed by the law as a matter of social
policy 171 Therefore, the privity requirement, although a natural out-
growth of the law of contract, was from the beginning an improper
graft on the law of negligence. For this reason the disappearance of
privity from negligence law cannot legitimately be used to justify
elimination of the rule from the law of contracts. Moreover, the basic
question in Middlleton was not whether lack of privity should or
should not have barred the clan of libelants, but whether the pnvity
question had any relevance at all. When the law began to attach
certain implied rights and obligations to those expressly assumed by
the parties to a contract, the privity rule lost much of its logical force
its operation, was intended to be as broad as the traditional tort jurisdiction of ad-
miralty." Id. at 92, 1954 A.M.C. at 1707. Since the crash occurred on navigable waters,
the DOHSA was applicable.
168 204 F Supp. at 858-59, 1962 A.M.C. at 1793.
169 See National Say. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 201-206 (1880).
170 See Black, The Status of the Rule Requiring Prwity in Breach of Warranty Ac-
tions in California, 10 HAsTINs L.J. 418, 424-25 (1959).
171 See STATmENT (SEcoND), ToRTs § 282 (1965).
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because the determination of the scope of such externally imposed
terms generally does not rest with the parties to the contract but
with the law which imposes them.172 These implied terms can there-
fore be supplemented, altered and expanded by the law as social needs
appear to demand. As the courts respond to societal pressures which
are perceived to require broadening of these obligations, judicial
focus begins to shift from a specific contract, of which the inplied
obligations were originally a part, to the general activity of the
enterprise whose conduct inevitably exposes members of the public
to risk of harm. At some point a policy decision is implicitly or ex-
plicitly made concerning who should bear the irreducible risk of
harm associated with nearly every commercial activity1 3 As the
growth of products liability law illustrates, the decision now is fre-
quently that one of the enterprises involved in the conduct of the
activity should bear its inherent risks rather than the individuals who
may be subjected to harm by them. The nature of this decision is
historically associated with the imposition of strict liability in tort
74
and bears little relation to any question of contract.
By this land of inexact jurisprudential piloting a passage is made
from contract law to tort law Unfortunately, the new landmarks of
strict liability continue to be described in the breach of warranty
language of contract, particularly where the facts are analogous to
those present in Middlleton.7 5 In that land of situation, however, no
genuine contract issues exist, and the relevant issue is not whether
172 See 1 WLmLISTON, SAiES § 197 (2d ed. 1924).
'73 See 2 HAnPER & JA Ms, TORTS 794-95 (1956).
174Professor Prosser has stated: "[Tihe suggestion had always been sufficiently
obvious that the 'warranty,' which was not really a warranty at all, and never had been
anything more than a transparent device to achieve the desired objective, was not only
unnecessary but undesirable. No one demed that the 'warranty' was a matter of strict
liability. No one disputed that m the absence of any contract between the parties, the
liability must lie m tort. Why not jettison the contract word, and talk merely of
strict liability m tort, declared in its own nght-a concept familiar enough to all lawyers
m the law of animals, abnormally dangerous activities, nuisance, workmen's compensa-
tion, respondeat superior, defamation, and even misrepresentation?" Prosser, Strict Lia-
bility to the Consumer in California, 18 HAsNsGs L.J. 9, 16 (1966). Where a contract
does exist between the person injured and his vendor, difficult conceptual problems arse
m the necessary attempts to accommodate strict liability m tort with the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code governing the sale of goods. See Franklin, When Worlds
Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. Rv.
974 (1966).
175 A somewhat similar problem exists in the negligence field. Although the basic
premise of negligence law has been that there should be no liability without fault, the
pressures of a modem industrial society have forced the creation of fictions (e.g.
respondeat superior) and presumptions (e.g. res ipsa loquitur) which lead to the 2m-
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lack of privity bars the actaon but whether strict liability should be
mposed.176 The MiddlIeton court did acknowledge that "the cause of
action complained of appears to be a maritime tort,"17 and thus did
not view the libelants' warranty actions as arising from contract. The
privity problem having been the principal point discussed in Middile-
ton, short shrift was given the ultimate question of respondent's lia-
bility The court stated.
It must be noted that the question here involved is not the nature of
liability; that is the province of the trial court. The sole question is
whether -the libellants are precluded from attempting to assert a claim
against the manufacturer because of the absence of a direct contrac-
tual relationship with such a respondent. As heretofore indicated, the
gravamen of the claim asserted by the libellants and attacked by the
respondent is basically tort-the violation of a duty to persons such
as the libellants. This motion tests solely the right of the libellants to
invoke such a claim. [T]he trial court has the duty of determining
the questions of proximate cause, the nature of the liability, the re-
lationship of the manufacturer and operator, the effect of maintenance
and any other relevant factual issues.178
What the court meant by "the nature of the liability" is unclear. If
libelants were not precluded from asserting their claim because of
the absence of a direct contractual relation, might they be because
the manufacturer was not strictly liable to them? If so, the court's
decision is almost facetiously narrow Libelants claimed "the violation
of a duty " When this claim is specifically described in terms of breach
of warranty the duty sought to be imposed is clearly one not to expose
persons such as libelant's decedents to any risk of harm, i.e., strict
liability By using the term "breach of implied warranty" the assump-
tion is made by the court that the manufacturer is strictly liable to
somebody, and discussion thus tends to focus on the irrelevant pnvity
issue. Privity is easily eliminated, as Middlleton illustrates, and strict
liability follows as a result without ever having been considered as
a separate issue. Whatever the MiddlIleton court may have thought it
was deciding, the case has been interpreted as holding that admiralty
position of liability where no fault exists. The name of the game is still negligence but
many of the rules by which it is played have been adapted from the law of strict
liability. See generally EinmzwExG, Lr.ABmr Wrrotrr FAULT (1951), reprinted in
54 CA=I. LAW l3v. 1422 (1966).
176 See Piossxm, TouTs § 97 at 678-681 (3d ed. 1964).
177 204 F Supp. at 857, 1962 A.M.C. at 1791.
178 204 F Supp. at 860, 1962 A.M.C. at 1795.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
recognizes a cause of action for strict liability m tort against a manu-
facturer.'
79
The next admiralty case involving a manufacturer's "warranty"
liability was Noel v. United Atrcraft Corp.,'80 which was also an action
brought under the DOHSA. In that case a propeller manufactured
by United and installed in an aircraft owned and operated by a
Venezuelan airline developed an overspeed during the course of a
flight from New York to Caracas, tore loose and ripped into the
fuselage. The plane exploded and crashed into the high seas, and all
of its occupants were killed. The libel alleged that United had been
negligent because it failed to perfect a safer propeller system and to
warn the airline of certain weaknesses in the propeller system of the
aircraft which crashed. Libelants later sought to amend by adding a
claim against United for breach of implied warranty of fitness. United
opposed the amendment, asserting, as m Middlleton, that privity was
lacking between it and libelants' decedent. Judge Layton, who heard
the motion, wrote a lengthy opinion m which he demed libelants'
request to amend although not on the ground urged by United.'8'
Because this opinion contains the fullest discussion presented to date
of a manufacturer's liabilities under the maritime law, the bases
of the decision are worth exammmg in some detail.
The court first considered the choice of law problem and, positing
that Congress by enacting the DOHSA had intended to establish a
uniform right of action for death on the high seas, concluded that
the federal maritime law, rather than state law, should apply to cases
arising under the DOHSA.182 Whether the cause of action which
libelants sought to allege was comprehended by the DOHSA was the
next question faced. While conceding "as an abstract matter" that
the word "default' m section one of the DOHSA might include such
179 See Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F Supp. 447, 1965 A.M.C.
1622 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F Supp. 929, 1965 A.M.C.
2305 (D. Del. 1962); see also 37 Tun. L. REv. 141 (1962); 48 VA. L. REv. 1467
(1962).
180 204 F Supp. 929, 1965 A.M.C. 2305 (D. Del. 1962).
181 The court quickly dispensed with the pnvity issue. "[Bloth parties have miscon-
ceived the nportance of the point for a reading of Seas Shippmg Co. v. Sieracki
[328 U.S. 85, 1946 A.M.C. 698 (1946)] indicates that the Supreme Court
would abolish the requirement of pnvity in admiralty if the question were squarely
raised." 204 F Supp. at 935, 1965 A.M.C. at 2315. The pnvity question in Sieracks
arose in connection with the alleged negligence of the shipbuilder and no assertion of
breach of warranty was made against it.
182 But see, Jeninngs v. Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 227 F Supp. 246, 1965 A.M.C.
1285 (D. Del. 1964). See also the caveat concerning the DOHSA note 173 supra.
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an action, Judge Layton nonetheless held that "breach of warranty of
fitness is a 'default' only if it is cognizable under the general mari-
tne law" 83 Middlleton v. United Aircraft Corp.18 4 was the sole
precedent discovered in tins regard. Judge Layton felt the Middlleton
court was preoccupied with the issue of pnvity and that "the im-
portant and key question, namely whether admiralty should
henceforth entertain suits on behalf of passengers against manufac-
turers of airplane or related parts based upon a breach of warranty
of fitness whether or not prwity was present, was not discussed."'185
Finding no other precedent, he therefore concluded that "an implied
warranty of fitness and merchantability is a phenomenon of state
sales law, and, as such, is unknown to the federal maritime law", 0
The libelant argued that such an action was inherent in the law of
admiralty by analogy to the shipowner's absolute duty to furnish a
seaworthy vessel. 8 7 This argument was rejected because it "ignores
completely the fact that the action here is not against the ship [sic]
but the manufacturer of one of her parts" 18 and also because "tradi-
tionally, the admiralty has limited the right of action based upon
unseaworthmess to seamen"89 or those doing seamen's work, a cate-
gory to which libelants' decedent did not belong. Moreover, mtro-
duction of implied warranty of fitness into admiralty would, accord-
mg to the court, create confusion "as to the relationship of implied
warranty of fitness to the existing admiralty doctrine of unseaworthi-
ness. [This] Court has tried and failed to find any meaningful
distinctions between the two doctrines. There is no substantial differ-
ence between the implied warranty that a propeller is fit and the
implied warranty that a propeller is seaworthy (or airworthy) The
only important difference lies in the classes of persons owing the
duty, and the class of persons protected."190
183 204 F Supp. at 933-34, 1965 A.M.C. at 2312-13.
184 204 F Supp. 856, 1962 A.M.C. 1789 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
185 204 F Supp. at 937, 1965 A.M.C. at 2318.
186 Id. at 934, 1965 A.M.C. at 2313. "This may well be because an implied war-
ranty of fitness is usually associated with the sale of goods, and because the sale of a
ship has traditionally been deemed outside all scope of admiralty ]urisdiction. An-
other reason why an implied warranty of fitness is unknown to admiralty may be that it
has always been possible to bring actions under this theory on the civil side of the
court." Ibid.
187 See, e.g., Mahmch v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 1944 A.M.C. 1 (1944).
See also GmMoRE & BrAct 315-32.
188 204 F Supp. at 934, 1965 A.M.C. at 2314.
189 Ibid.
190 204 F Supp. at 940, 1965 A.M.C. at 2323. The court also considered and re-
jected libelant's argument that admiralty should borrow state law principles of strict
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Judge Layton then restated the question to be decided: "the real
point in issue is whether admiralty should now incorporate
what amounts to a drastically new concept into the body of its law
based upon the rationale that manufacturers by means of insurance
and raising prices are better able than the injured consumer to
absorb losses in cases resulting from defective parts."'91 This, accord-
ing to Judge Layton, "is a conclusion based upon economic policy
historically within the province of Congress or a legislature.
Courts are peculiarly unfitted to make such findings. ",192 He
therefore held that "a cause of action in implied warranty of fitness
and merchantability (with or without privity) does not presently
exist in the federal maritime law "193 The motion by libelants to amend
their libel was, accordingly, demed.194
The Noel court's treatment of the privity issue, as well as its state-
ment concerning "the real point in issue," indicate that it regarded
libelant's claim not as one for breach of warranty sounding in con-
liability as applied in cases of poisoned foods, drugs, drinks and dangerous instrumentali-
ties. The court held that "an airplane passenger clearly is not within the class of persons
protected by the rationale of the poisoned food cases." 204 F Supp. at 936, 1965 A.M.C.
2317.
191 Id. at 935, 1965 A.M.C. at 2315. The insurance argument, according to judge
Layton, "completely overlooks the fact that in airline flights a passenger can easily and
inexpensively procure insurance for a given flight through a machine at almost any air-
port." 204 F Supp. at 938, 1965 A.M.C. at 2320. This statement was not really a response
to the argument advanced. The availability of insurance to the manufacturer is an in-
portant consideration, but not the central one. "What insurance can do, of course, is to
distribute losses proportionately among a group who are to bear them. What it cannot
and should not do is to determine whether the group shall bear them in the first instance
-and whether, for example, consumers shall be compelled to accept substantial price
increases on everthing they buy in order to compensate others for their misfortunes."
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1121 (1960).
192 204 F Supp. at 935, 1965 A.M.C. at 2315. (Footnote omitted.)
103 Id. at 941, 1965 A.M.C. at 2324.
1904 The manufacturer's victory in Noel was only temporary. The case was subse-
quently tried before Judge Layton, who found that United had been negligent in not
warning the airline of overspeed problems which occurred in similar propeller systems
on other aircraft and in failing, subsequent to the installation of the system, to develop
improvements to prevent the occurrence of propeller overspeed. Noel v. United Aircraft
Corp., 219 F Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1963). These findings were affirmed on appeal. Noel
v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964). A petition for rehearing was
demed. Ibid. One judge concurred in and two judges dissented from the demal. All three
were disturbed by the finding that the manufacturer owed a continuing duty to develop
improvements in the safety of his product. The concurring judge stated: "This doctrine
is new and far reaching and, in my view, may well be unsound." 342 F.2d at 242. A
commentator has characterized the holding as "indeed novel in inposmg a heavy post-
sale obligation on an initially innocent manufacturer." 40 TuL. L. REv. 436, 443 (1966).
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tract but rather as an inarticulate allegation of strict liability The
seaworthiness doctrine was an obvious parallel to the cause of action
which libelant sought to allege. In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki' 5
the Supreme Court described the shipowner's absolute obligation to
furmsh a seaworthy ship to seamen and those doing seamen's work
as being non-contractual in nature and as "essentialy a species of
liability without fault, analogous to other well known instances m
our law Derived from and shaped to meet the hazards which perform-
mg the service imposes, the liability is neither limited by conceptions
of negligence nor contractual in nature."196 judge Layton approached
this doctrine seeking an analog in fact rather than one in principle.
Not surprisingly, he found the factual analogy did not exist. However,
the principle of the seaworthiness doctrine was analogous because it
involved the same basic question presented in Noel: whether-the
risk of harm associated with an activity should be allocated to one of
the enterprises participating in it rather than to those endangered
by the risk. 97 The so-called "risk-spreading" rationale was advanced
in Noel in support of allocating the risk to the propeller manufacturer.
fudge Layton felt that such a theory could not be endorsed absent
economic proof of its validity Yet the risk-spreading concept was
precisely the justification given by the Supreme Court in Sierackz for
imposing strict liability on the shipowner for injuries resulting from
unseaworthiness. The Court stated: "[T]he owner is in position,
as the worker is not, to distribute the loss in the shipping community
which receives the service and should bear its cost.""" This state-
ment echoed one made nearly ten years before in the H.A. Scandrett,99
the first federal case directly holding that the shipowner's liability for
unseaworthmess was absolute.200 The court stated:
A snp is an instrumentality full of internal hazards aggravated, if not
created, by the uses to which she is put [E]verythmg is to be
said for holding her absolutely liable to her crew for injuries arising
from defects in her hull and equipment. The liability can be covered
by insurance and is better treated as an expense of the business than
one left to an uncertain determination of courts in actions to recover
for negligence.201
195 328 U.S. 85, 1946 A.M.C. 698 (1946).
106 Id. at 94, 1946 A.M.C. at 704.
197 See Seas Slippmg Co. v. Sierackl, 328 U.S. 85, 1946 A.M.C. 698 (1946).
198 328 U.S. at 94, 1946 A.M.C. at 704.
199 87 F.2d 708, 1937 A.M.C. 326 (2d Cir. 1937).
200 See Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthtness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39
CoNirN L. Q. 381, 396 (1954).
20187 F.2d at 711, 1937 A.M.C. at 331.
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The Noel court could have recognized the analogy of the sea-
worthiness doctrine, accepted the risk-spreading theory and still have
reached the same result. If the risk-spreading theory is followed, the
most logical enterprise upon which to fasten strict liability is the one
with which the risk is most closely associated. An airplane crash is
principally an incident of the business of carrying passengers by air,
and the airline is thus the most logical enterprise upon which to im-
pose liability 20 2 The airline is also the business which directly profits
from the passengers, and it is the one upon which the passengers
rely 2 03 These factors weigh against imposing liability on the propeller
manufacturer. In Noel, moreover, the air carriage was governed by
the Warsaw Convention,204 a treaty which defines and limits the
carrier's liability If the propeller manufacturer were held strictly
liable, it presumably would pass the cost of such liability on to its
customers, the airlines. Libelants would therefore be able to accom-
plish indirectly what they could not have done directly This, it could
be argued, would subvert the purpose of the treaty The Noel court
could therefore have held that United was not the proper party upon
whom to impose strict liability, assuming such liability should be
imposed on anyone. In any event the decision in Noel was not
destined to serve as the foundation of a seaward citadel capable of
defending the maritime law against the numerous broadsides from the
land law courts which even then were engaged in scattering strict
liability in all directions. °
The opportunity to choose between Middlleton and Noel was
presented in Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,200 a case
which also arose under the DOHSA and which involved the crash
of a U.S. Navy blimp into the Atlantic Ocean off the New Jersey
coast. In addition to Goodyear (the blimp's manufacturer), the Ed-
wards Company, maker of a warning system designed to sound when
the balloon began to lose gas, was named as a respondent. Libelants
claimed breach of implied warranty against each respondent, assert-
ing that the seams of the gas bag were improperly assembled and
that the warning system was faulty Respondents moved for summary
202 See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81
(1963) (dissenting opmion).
203 Ibid.
204 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct. 12, 1949, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876.
205 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
200 231 F Supp. 447, 1965 A.M.C. 1622 (S.D.NY. 1960).
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judgment on the ground that libelants had failed to state a cause of
action. The court first considered Goodyear's liability and elected to
follow the Middlleton precedent. Support for this election was found
in the shipowner/stevedore indemnity cases207 in which "the absolute
liability imposed under an inplied warranty of workmanlike service
has been analogized by the Supreme Court to the supplier's warranty
of the fitness of his product."2 8 It was therefore "a short step to
directly recognize implied warranties in admiralty actions "209
Furthermore:
A second parallel of the two types of implied warranty actions makes
it requisite that they be treated similarly by admiralty courts. The
theory underlying the imposition of an implied warranty of work-
manlike service is an attempt to allocate losses to the enterprise most
capable of minimizing the risk.
The same -theory underlies breach of implied warranties in a suit
against the manufacturer of an airship. If the defect in the ship was
due to faulty manufacture, and it was a latent defect, the maker is
clearly in a better position than -the purchaser of the ship to prevent
or ,remedy it.
210
Having thus disposed of Goodyear's motion, the court considered
that of Edwards, who relied on the decision of the New York Court of
Appeals in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.21 1 In Goldberg,
under facts similar to those in Montgomery, the court allowed a breach
of warranty action?12 against an aircraft builder, but not against the
maker of an allegedly faulty altimeter installed in the airplane. The
basis for denying the warranty action against the manufacturer of the
component part was that "adequate protection is provided for the
passengers by casting in liability the airplane manufacturer which
put into the market the completed aircraft."213 The Montgomery
court observed that it was "not bound by that determination," but
"the similarity of facts in Kolsman and in the case at bar is so over-
whelming that the reasoning of the case should be applied here."214
207 E.g., Italia Societa Per Aziom di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedorng Co., 376
U.S. 315, 1964 A.M.C. 1075 (1964); Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,
350 U.S. 124, 1956 A.M.C. 9 (1956).
208 231 F Supp. at 454, 1965 A.M.C. at 1631.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibzd.
21112 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
212The New York Court of Appeals observed that strict liability was "surely a more
accurate phrase." Id. at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 83.
213 Id. at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83.
214 231 F Supp. at 455, 1965 A.M.C. at 1633.
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The breach of warranty action against Edwards was therefore dis-
missed.215
Inherent in the theory that the manufacturer is better able to
remedy or prevent defects and therefore should be held strictly liable
for the injuries they cause, is the belief that such liability will en-
courage remedial or preventive measures.21 6 In this connection Pro-
fessor Prosser has commented:
A skeptic may well question whether the callous manufacturer, who
is unmoved by the prospect of negligence liability, plus res zpsa
loquitor, and by the effect of any injury whatever upon the reputa-
,tion of his goods, will really be stimulated by the relatively slight
increase in possible liability to take additional precautions against
defects which cannot be prevented by only reasonable care.217
The rationale of the Montgomery decision is of doubtful conceptual
utility Because of the supposed adequacy of the libelants' remedy
against Goodyear strict liability was not imposed on the Edwards
Company Yet the remedying of defects by the principal manufacturer
will be of little use if the maker of a vital component part continues to
supply a defective product. If the Montgomery court's theory was
valid, strict liability should also have been imposed on the Edwards
Company
The nature of the component part manufacturer's liability has
been involved in two recent maritime cases, and in both strict liability
was imposed. One of these, McKee v. Brunswick Corp.218 has already
been discussed in some detail. There strict liability was nposed on
the retailer, the manufacturer of the boat and the maker of the coil
on its engine. Since the court of appeals apparently did not view
the issues before it as involving maritime law its decision is not a
useful precedent. In the other case, Sevits v. McKiernan-Terry
Corp.,21" plaintiff, a member of the crew of the United States air-
craft carrier Constellation was injured at sea as a result of the failure
of one of the vessel's arresting engines220 which had been manufac-
tured by the defendants. The carrier had been built in a United
States naval shipyard, and the Government, in its capacity as ship-
215 Ibid.
216 See Italia Societa Per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315,1964 A.M.C. 1075 (1964).
217prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1119 (1960). (Footnote omitted.)
218 354 F.2d 577, 1966 A.M.C. 344 (7th Cir. 1965).
219 264 F Supp. 810, 1966 A.M.C. 1953 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
220 The arresting engine was part of the earner's aircraft landing system. Id. at 811,
1966 A.M.C. at 1954.
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builder, was immune from suit.221 Defendants, in reliance upon the
Noe, 222 Montgomery2 and Goldberg2 24 decisions, moved to dismiss
plaintiff's third cause of action which pleaded the breach of "an im-
plied warranty of fitness for use, allegedly running to the plaintiff,
arising out of the sale of the engine by defendants to the Navy "225
The court declined to follow Noel because "there is no logical reason
which justifies the position that implied warranties are not and should
not be recognized in admiralty" 226 Moreover, "if the plaintiff can
make out an action based on implied warranty, the fact that admiralty
law is involved should not be a bar to his recovery on that
theory "227 Montgomery and Goldberg were "distinguished" on
the ground that plaintiff Sevits "has no right to sue the manufacturer
of the entire ship" and if forbidden to sue the manufacturer of the
component part "'the theory of implied warranty which he has a
right to assert under admiralty law would become meaningless."
22 s
The court therefore found "that in the interest of justness and fairness,
the plaintiff has a right to assert the theory of implied warranty
against the manufacturer of the arresting engine."229 In Sevits
the judicial humanitarian instinct, always influential but seldom con-
trolling, was the paramount factor in the result reached. The "interest
of justness and fairness" was thus brought into collision with the
frail product of the Montgomery'" and Middlleton231 efforts to con-
struct the necessary conceptual framework required if strict liability
is to be imposed on a rational and predictable basis, and their work
was perhaps rendered a total loss as a result.
Defendants 'in maritime products liability cases have not been
limited to manufacturers. An effort to mipose strict liability on the
shipper of a cargo of sulphur was made by plaintiffs in Cunningham
v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,23s but was so well disguised in the pleadings
221 Id. at 811, 1966 A.M.C. 1954.
222 Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F Supp. 929, 1965 A.M.C. 2305 (D. Del.
1962).
223 Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F Supp. 447, 1965 A.M.C.
1622 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
224 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
225 264 F Supp. at 812, 1966 A.M.C. at 1954.
226 Id. at 814, 1966 A.M.C. at 1957.
227 Ibth.
228 Id. at 814, 1966 A.M.C. at 1958.
229 Ibid.
230 Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F Supp. 447, 1962 A.M.C.
1622 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
231 Middlleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F Supp. 856, 1965 A.M.C. 1789
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
232 231 F Supp. 934, 1965 A.M.C. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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that the court did not pass directly on the question. The S.S. Marine
Sulphur Queen disappeared at sea and no trace of the vessel or her
crew was ever found. The action brought on behalf of the missing
crew members was prosecuted against Bethlehem, the owner of the
ship, and against Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the shipper of the cargo.
As to the latter the claim was made that the cargo was unseaworthy
and that the cargo owner owed a duty to supply a seaworthy cargo
to the crewmen of the vessel. This claim was dismissed by the court
because "nowhere have we been cited to any authority which would
indicate that there is such a duty upon the cargo owner."2- 3 It is
clear that plaintiffs were seeking to impose strict liability on the
shipper. Phrasing the complaint in terms of unseaworthmess, however,
suggested that the decedents' status as seamen was alone sufficient
to support the liability sought. As the decision in Noel' 4 illustrates,
the utility of the seaworthiness doctrine as a factual analog is ques-
tionable, and focus on its factual aspects tends to preclude considera-
tion of the larger issues which are recognized and discussed when the
more typical products liability allegation of breach of implied war-
ranty or strict liability are employed.
A slhpper's responsibility was more generally discussed in China
Union Lines, Ltd. v. A. 0 Andersen & Co.2 Two shps collided in
the Houston ship channel, and heavy loss of life, severe personal
injuries and property damage followed. One of the vessels was a
chemical carrier and had stowed in its skin tanks a quantity of
acrylonitrile which, as a result of the collision, caught fire and burned.
This chemical when burning gives off highly toxic fames. Some of the
injured parties filed libels against American Cyanamid, the shipper-
manufacturer "on the theory that the acrylonitrile was of such a
dangerous nature and propensity as to render [Cyanamid] liable
to said parties."2 6 The trial court dismissed the libels against
Cyanamid. The dismissal was affirmed on appeal on the ground that
the evidence showed that the toxicity of acrylonitrile had not caused
any of the injuries clauned.2 7 Justice Brown dissented on this issue
because in his view the question of causation had not been satisfac-
torily dealt with by the trial judge. His observations concerning the
liability of Cyanamid are of interest:
233 Id. at 938, 1965 A.M.C. at 344.
234Noel v. United Anrcraft Corp., 204 F Supp. 929, 1965 A.M.C. 2305 (D. Del.
1962).
235 364 F.2d 769, 1966 A.M.C. 1653 (5th Cir. 1966).
236 Id. at 774, 1966 A.M.C. at 1656.
237 Id. at 788-92, 1966 A.M.C. at 1691-93.
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Cyanamid is the manufacturer and supplier of a chemical that it
knows can and does kill. Cyanamid's awesome obligations in this day
of products liability when Acrylonitrile goes to sea is no less than on
land. It owed a duty literally -to the world. The duties owed
to this limitless group of protectees require as a miimum that it not
knowingly participate in a method of handling or transport which
would iprudently imperil the lives of these people. I do not suggest
here that Cyanand has the liability of an insurer, but when
the material is fraught with so much danger, the liabilities may be
almost absolute either because the so-called ordinary care of the pru-
dent person itself calls for care which is extraordinary or because of
principles of strict liability 23
8
The comments of Justice Brown illustrate that the policy issues
which underlie a products liability action may be reached directly
and that deviations involving consideration of privity and warranty
can be avoided. As Professor Gillam has observed.
There is nothing wrong with fictions, if they work. The test is purely
pragmatic. Any one of these [fictional] approaches might work, but
none of them squarely faces the real issue: as a matter of eco-
nomic policy, should the manufacturer be liable without fault ?
The policy decision should be faced and made, and, if absolute lia-
bility is found to be called for, it should be imposed directly, without
fiction or analogy, upon simple grounds of policy 231
Conclusion
In the preceding sections an effort has been made to disclose and
discuss some of the basic problems which can arise in a maritime
products liability case. Failure to maintain a proper lookout for these
problems has been a recurring error in the cases which have arisen to
date. Even when such problems have been detected and recognized
as potential hazards the complex jurisprudential methods of naviga-
tion employed to avoid them have occasionally resulted m concep-
tual strandings. Courts of admiralty have long prided themselves on
their ability to deal creatively with novel legal issues. The present
state of the law of maritime products liability presents an opportunity
for them to engage in such creative action.
238 Id. at 795-97, 1966 A.M.C. at 1691-93. Compare Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 1953 A.M.C. 1175 (1953).
239 Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Opx. L. REv. 119, 155 (1958).
